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NOTES
OHIO V. KO VA CS: FINANCIAL FREEDOM
FOR BANKRUPT POLLUTERS
I. INTRODUCTION
The bankruptcy courts and United States courts of appeals have encoun-
tered severe conflicts between the operation of the current Bankruptcy Code
(the Code)' and state and federal enforcement of environmental regulations. 2
When a debtor files for bankruptcy under the Code, the debtor's assets are
distributed pro rata to the creditors and the debtor discharges the remaining
debts.' The Code does not discriminate between government and private
claimholders. Therefore, if a state or federal environmental protection agency
holds a "claim" against a bankrupt debtor, such as a legal obligation to
clean a hazardous waste site, the debtor can also discharge such a "claim"
in bankruptcy. Once the claim is discharged, the government can no longer
require the debtor to clean up the waste site. 4
The conflict between environmental and bankruptcy policies is illustrated
by the Supreme Court's decision in Ohio v. Koiwcs.5 In Kovacs, the debtor
was a hazardous waste site operator who entered into a consent decree with
the state of Ohio. As part of the settlement, the operator agreed to clean a
waste site that he owned. Not long after the settlement, however, the operator
petitioned for bankruptcy. Ohio intervened in the bankruptcy proceeding to
argue that Kovacs's cleanup obligation, so long as it had not been converted
into an obligation to pay money to the state, could not be discharged in
bankruptcy. 6 The bankruptcy court, and ultimately the Supreme Court,
rejected the state's argument and held that Kovacs's obligation could be
discharged.
1. The Bankruptcy Code was created by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of Nov. 6, 1978,
Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101 to 1330 (1982 & Supp. 1984)).
2. See generally In re Quanta Resources, 739 F.2d 927 (3d Cir. 1984), cert granted sub
nom. O'Neill v. City of New York, 105 S. Ct. 1168 (1985) (disallowing bankruptcy trustee
from abandoning hazardous waste site, and compelling debtor's estate to bear the costs of
cleanup); Penn Terra Ltd. v. Department of Envtl. Resources, 733 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1984)
(state stayed from collecting compensation from bankrupt debtor who is liable for environmental
damages).
3. See generally 11 U.S.C. § 727 (1984) (debtor is discharged under Chapter Seven of the
Code); 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d) (1984) (discharge of debtor under Chapter Eleven of the Code).
4. 11 U.S.C. § 524(a) (1982 & Supp. 1984).
5. 105 S. Ct. 705 (1985).
6. Id. at 708. Ohio argued that Kovacs's obligation to pay the costs of cleanup was not a
claim as defined by 11 U.S.C. § 101(4), and was therefore not dischargeable under 11 U.S.C.
§ 727(b).
1069
DEPA UL LA W REVIEW
The Supreme Court's decision in Kovacs may undermine government
efforts to correct environmental hazards. If the bankruptcy courts and federal
courts of appeals interpret the Kovacs decision broadly, and discharge all
environmental cleanup obligations held by debtors that are reducible to cash
remedies, the state and federal governments will have to bear the entire cost
of cleaning up waste sites. This will result in more environmental contami-
nation. This Note illustrates, through the Kovacs decision, how the Bank-
ruptcy Code interferes with state and federal environmental protection efforts.
Federal bankruptcy policy commands that a debtor's assets be preserved so
that they may be distributed among all creditors without unfair preference.
State and federal environmental policies, meanwhile, strive to preserve nat-
ural resources and correct damage caused by environmental polluters. In
Kovacs, the Supreme Court faced a choice between these policies and decided
that the debtor's interests should prevail.
II. BACKGROUND: THE LEGAL CONFLICT BETWEEN
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND BANKRUPTCY
A. Bankruptcy Claims under the Code: Section lOI(4)(B)
Prior to 1978, bankruptcy law in the United States was governed by the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898 (the Act). 7 Under the Act, a creditor was required
to prove to the court that it actually had a claim against a bankrupt before
the court would allow the creditor to enter the bankruptcy adjudication.'
Section 63 of the Act listed nine categories of debts that could be proved
and allowed against a bankrupt's estate. 9 This narrow and exclusive list
closed off large classes of potential claims from consideration in bankruptcy
proceedings.' 0 Creditors that were excluded from bankruptcy proceedings by
the old Act could not share in the distribution of assets from the debtor's
estate."' Following the bankruptcy proceedings, creditors who were excluded
from the bankruptcy action could assert their claims against the bankrupt
debtor in separate actions. 2
Congress replaced the old Act with the current Code in 1978 to simplify
the bankruptcy process for debtors. 3 The Code was designed to give the
7. Bankruptcy Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1978).
8. Id. § 17(a).
9. Id. § 63 (listing debts that can be discharged).
10. Matthews, The Scope of Claims Under the Bankruptcy Code-Second Installment, 57
AM. BANKR. L.J. 221, 224 (1983). See also Copeland v. Emory Investors, Ltd., 466 F. Supp.
510 (D. Del. 1977), aff'd without opinion, 586 F.2d 834 (3d Cir. 1978) (securities fraud claims
provable only if quasi-contractual).
11. Bankruptcy Act of 1898 §§ 63-74.
12. Id.
13. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 116-18, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 5963, 6076-78.
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debtor a "fresh start"'14 after bankruptcy. A major reform in the Code was
the elimination of the requirement that a claim be provable before it could
be discharged in bankruptcy. 5 This reform expanded the number and variety
of claims that could be discharged in a bankruptcy proceeding. The Code
also contains provisions that preserve the estate's value during bankruptcy
proceedings and that facilitate the distribution of assets in an orderly and
equitable fashion. 16 Each of these reforms helped to simplify the bankruptcy
process and benefited debtors by freeing them from a myriad of post-
bankruptcy claims.
Much adjudication over the types of claims that can be discharged in
bankruptcy has centered on what constitutes a "claim" under the Code.
While claims are commonly discharged in bankruptcy, "nonclaims" are
not. 7 Also, the value of all claims must be determined by the court to assess
each creditor's pro rata share from the estate. 8 Section 101(4) of the Bank-
ruptcy Code defines a claim as follows:
(A) right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment,
liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured, legal,
equitable, secured or unsecured; or (B) right to an equitable remedy for
breach of performance if such breach gives right to payment, whether or
not such right to an equitable remedy is reduced to judgment, fixed
contingent, matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, secured or unse-
cured. 9
Under this definition, the Code contemplates that all legal obligations, no
matter how remote or contingent, will be handled in the bankruptcy pro-
ceeding.20 Thus, if a legal obligation fits within the definition of section
101(4), that obligation may be discharged.
The definition of a claim under section 101(4)(B) is composed of three
elements: "equitable remedy," "breach of performance," and "right to
payment." ' 2 While none of these terms are defined by the Code, the case
14. See In re Dabney, 3 Bankr. 719, 720 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1980); S. REP. No. 989, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 7, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AO. NEws 5787, 5793; see also Perez
v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 648 (1971) (debtors have "new opportunity" in bankruptcy to
restore financial condition) (quoting Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934)).
15. 11 U.S.C. § 504 (1982 & Supp. 1984).
16. See, e.g., id. § 362 (bankruptcy proceedings automatically stay legal actions by creditors
against debtors); id. § 507 (establishing six levels of priority claims); id. § 547 (empowering
bankruptcy trustee to invalidate certain pre-bankruptcy transfers).
17. See id. § 523 (exceptions to discharge); id. § 524 (effect of discharge); id. § 727(b)
(scope of discharge in Chapter Seven); id. § 1141(d) (scope of discharge after confirmation of
Chapter Eleven plan); id. § 1328 (discharge under Chapter Thirteen plan).
18. See id. § 726 (order of distribution); id. § 1129(a)(7) (condition to confirmation of
Chapter Eleven plan is that those with claims accept the plan or receive at least liquidation
value); id. § 1325 (confirmation of chapter 13 plan).
19. Id. § 101(4).
20. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 21-22 (1978), reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWs 5787, 5807-08.
21. I1 U.S.C. § 101(4)(B) (1982 & Supp. 1984).
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law and legislative history related to this section are useful guides for
evaluating the proper scope of a claim. For example, in the recent case of
In re O.P.M. Leasing Services, Inc.,22 the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern
District of New York decided that a breach of a service contract by a
contractor against a state was a "claim" under the Code.23 In In re O.P.M.,
the state of West Virginia leased computer equipment from O.P.M. Leasing
Services. O.P.M. subsequently filed a Chapter Eleven reorganization bank-
ruptcy, and the company's trustee refused to honor the service contract with
the state. The court held that the trustee's rejection of the service contract
was a breach of that contract 24 and a corresponding breach of performance
under section 101(4)(B). 25 The court also found that when the state moved
during the bankruptcy adjudications to relinquish its right to service in
exchange for an abatement of the lease payments on the computer equip-
ment, 26 the state converted its contractual right to damages into a right to
equitable relief. 27 The court reasoned that the state's motion to set a reduced
fee for the continued use of the computer equipment was a claim under
section 101(4)(B). 28 The claim was therefore held to be dischargeable in
bankruptcy.2 9
In another case, In re All Media Properties, Inc.,30 the Bankruptcy Court
for the Southern District of Texas decided that two involuntary Chapter
22. 21 Bankr. 993, 998 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982).
23. Id. at 998.
24. Id. at 1003. See also II U.S.C. § 365(g) (1982 & Supp. 1984) (listing instances in which
rejection of executory contract or unexpired lease constitutes a breach).
25. 21 Bankr. at 1003. A "breach of performance," in the traditional sense, implies failure
to act or fulfill an obligation. If the Code drafters had intended the term "breach of perform-
ance" to have a more narrow interpretation, the term "breach of contract" could have easily
been used; Congress has limited other sections of the Code by use of contract language. See,
e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (1982 & Supp. 1984) ("trustee . . . may assume or reject an executory
contract or lease of the debtor"). Also, a "breach of duty" is too broad to be equated with a
"breach of performance." A "breach of duty" could theoretically give rise to every equitable
remedy. It therefore appears that Congress used "breach of performance" to limit the range
of equitable remedies that fall within section 101(4)(B).
26. 21 Bankr. at 1003.
27. Id. "Equitable remedy" is not defined in the Code. Some commentators have argued
that the terms in section 101(4)(B), including "equitable remedy," should be given a uniform
meaning regardless of the various state definitions. See, e.g., Matthews, supra note 10, at 223
n. 10. In order to define "equitable remedy" uniformly, the term should be analyzed within
the scope of section 101(4) as a whole. Therefore, since the Code provides for monetary remedies
through rights to payment in § 101(4)(A), "equitable remedy" should be limited to nonpayment
remedies. Defining "equitable remedy" as any nonpayment remedy does not interfere with
Congress' purpose in enacting the Code and does not undermine the concept of "claims" as
used in the Code. Thus, a breach of performance that could result in a nonpayment remedy,
as determined by state law, is an equitable remedy for purposes of bankruptcy law. See
Matthews, supra note 10, at 351-53.
28. 21 Bankr. at 1003.
29. Id. at 998.
30. 5 Bankr. 126 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1980).
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Eleven petitions were properly brought by creditors under the Code where
the creditors were owed money as a substitute for a specific performance
judgment. The case was decided on the ground that the creditors had claims,
and therefore standing, to file the petitions against All Media.3 The creditors
were orginally entitled to specific performance from All Media after it failed
to perform under trade agreements with the creditors. Under Texas law,
specific performance is an equitable remedy, and a party entitled to specific
performance may recover money damages in lieu of specific performance.3 2
Although the petitioning creditors were not originally owed a cash payment
by All Media, Texas law gave them a contingent right to cash payment and
thereby converted their interest into a claim for money damages. The All
Media court held that if a creditor is entitled to an equitable remedy that
can be converted into a right to payment, the creditor has a claim under
section 101(4)(B). 3
The All Media court's decision was based on its definition of the term
"right to payment." The court held that a "right to payment" was more
than just the tender of money for a debt, and that it also included the
delivery of other value to the creditor.3 4 The court interpreted the term "right
to payment" in its broadest possible scope. An equitable remedy for breach
of performance that gives rise to a right to payment of money or other value
under the All Media approach is, therefore, also a claim under section
101(4)(B).
The legislative history of section 101 (4)(B) does not preclude the All Media
court's interpretation of the right to payment. A joint legislative statement
by Representative Don Edwards and Senator Dennis DeConcini illustrates
that section 101(4)(B) was intended to allow the liquidation or estimation of
contingent rights of payment to be discharged in bankruptcy. The statement
31. Id.
32. See Klein v. Garth, 677 S.W.2d 712 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984).
33. Id. at 126. A "right to payment" in section 101(4)(B) can be interpreted in two ways.
First, a right to payment could be interpreted to exist when there is a claim for equitable relief
unless a suit for money damages for the breach would not be permitted. The second interpre-
ation, which would diminish dramatically the scope of section 101(4)(B) claims, allows as
claims only those rights for equitable relief that could be compensated adequately by an award
of money. A claim for nominal damages would therefore not be within the scope of subsection
101(4)(B). See Matthews, supra note 10, at 342.
34. All Media, 5 Bankr. at 137.
35. Representative Edwards and Senator DeConcini delivered identical speeches in their
respective Congressional houses. See 124 CoNG. REc. 3293 (1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards);
124 CONG. REC. 33,992 (1978) (statement of Sen. DeConcini).
Much confusion centers around how section 101(4)(B) should be applied. If the Code section
is read in conjunction with the legislative history, a right to an equitable remedy will be a claim
only if it gives rise to an "alternative right to payment." See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 308-14, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5963, 6271-77; S.
REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 21-22, 24, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 5787, 5707-08, 5710. A broad interpretation of section 101(4)(B) under this "alternative
19851 1073
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implies that an equitable remedy for Section 101(4)(B) must be a legally
authorized alternative to a right to payment.3 6 Nevertheless, Congress left
the language of the Code broad enough to include all equitable remedies
that are alternative, additional, or supplemental to the right to payment.
Thus, the legislative history does not preclude the expansive interpretation
given the right to payment by the All Media court. So long as the claim is
within the broad category of claims as defined by section 101(4), the claim
is subject to discharge.
B. The Effect of Bankruptcy on Environmental Law Enforcement
Under the current Code, bankruptcy law has begun to interfere with
environmental law enforcement. For example, in the area of hazardous waste
disposal, since compliance with environmental regulations is costly,3 7 some
polluters have used bankruptcy to escape liability under environmental laws.
Courts have recently faced the problem of whether bankrupt polluters can
discharge their liability for producing hazardous waste dumps.3" This issue
remedies" concept would treat any equitable remedy as a claim so long as it gives rise to any
alternative right to a payment of money or value, even if the payment is not compensatory.
If the "alternative remedies" concept is rejected, a right to an equitable remedy would be a
claim even if it were an additional remedy rather than an alternative one. Rejection of the
"alternative remedies" concept would significantly enlarge the scope of section 101(4)(B).
Virtually any right to an equitable remedy that gave rise to any right to payment, whether the
right was supplemental, additional, or alternative, would be a valid "claim."
36. The "alternative remedies" concept is not part of the Code. The concept appears at
124 CONG. REC. 32,393 (1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards). Comments by the Senate sponsor
of the bill, Senator Dennis DeConcini, explained the definition and offered an example of a
section 101(4)(B) claim:
Section 101(4)(B) represents a modification of the House-passed bill to include the
definition of claim as a right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if
such breach gives rise to a right to payment. This is intended to cause the liquidation
or estimation of contingent rights of payment for which there may be an alternative
equitable remedy with the result that the equitable remedy will be susceptible to
being discharged in bankruptcy. For example, in some States, a judgment for
specific performance may be satisfied by an alternative right to payment, in the
event performance is refused; in that event, the creditor entitled to specific per-
formance would have a 'claim' for purposes of a proceeding under title 11.
124 CoNG. REC. 33,992 (1978) (statement of Sen DeConcini).
37. A minimum of $13.5 billion will be needed over the next five years to clean up abandoned
hazardous waste sites under a reauthorized Superfund law, according to a coalition of citizen,
labor, health, and environmental groups. 15 ENV'T REa. (BNA) 1663 (Feb. 15, 1985). President
Reagan has proposed to more than triple the Superfund, increasing it to $5.3 billion over the
next five years. Congress has estimated that the money necessary to clean up abandoned
hazardous waste sites over the next five years is between $7.5 and $10.1 billion. 15 ENV'T REP.
(BNA) 1787-88 (Mar. 1, 1985).
38. See In re Quanta Resources, 739 F.2d 912, 927 (3d Cir. 1984) (Code does not exempt
debtors from liability for waste disposal), cert. granted sub nom. O'Neill v. City of New York,
105 S. Ct. 1168 (1985); Penn Terra Ltd. v. Department of Envtl. Resources, 733 F.2d 267 (3d
1074
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involves the conflicting government interests of environmental protection
and the preservation of bankrupt estates. In these recent cases, bankruptcy
interests have prevailed over the enforcement of environmental laws.
The conflict between bankruptcy and environmental law stems principally
from the automatic stay provision in the current Code.39 This provision,
section 362, stays all legal proceedings against the debtor while a petition
for liquidation or reorganization is pending.4 Section 362 was adopted to
control the distribution ot a debtor's assets, and particularly, to assure that
the distribution among creditors would be fair. 4' Section 362 freezes the
debtor's assets, preventing disbursement of the debtor's assets until the court
orders an equitable distribution among the creditors. 42 Ordinarily, a creditor
who claims an interest in the property of the debtor's estate is prevented
from recovering an interest in the property until the stay is lifted. 43
Section 362(b)(4) exempts the enforcement of police or regulatory powers
from the stay." Generally, under the Code, a government agency can file a
suit against a debtor and order the debtor to clean up an environmental
hazard for which it is liable. If an environmental protection agency seeks
only to abate an existing violation, for instance, an injunction may be ordered
Cir. 1985) (order to compel debtor to correct environmental damage not subject to the automatic
stay); In re Borne Chemical Co., No. 80-00495 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1984) (cleanup of hazardous
waste site is bankruptcy trustee's obligation, since it is part of the sale of an estate's real estate
holdings); In re T.P. Long Chemical Co., Inc., No. 581-906 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio, Jan. 1984)
(considering EPA cleanup expenditures as an administrative expense of the estate is appropriate).
39. 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1982 & Supp. 1984).
40. The legislative history of the Code emphasizes the importance of the automatic stay
piovision to the scheme of the Code:
The automatic stay is one of the fundamental debtor protections provided by the
bankruptcy laws. It gives the debtor a breathing spell from his creditors. It stops
all collection efforts, all harassment, and all foreclosure actions. It permits the
debtor to attempt a repayment plan or reorganization plan or simply to be relieved
of the financial pressure that drove him into bankruptcy.
S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 54, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
5787, 5740.
The automatic stay was developed in 1973 by the Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules.
The Advisory Committee's initial purpose for seeking enactment of the automatic stay provision
was to remedy the inequities that persecute debtors who seek to reorganize their financial
affairs. Business debtors were often so concerned with staying in business that they lost track
of the lawsuits pending against them in various courts around the country. The automatic stay
was adopted to allow debtors to order their financial affairs. Address by Norman Nachman,
Member of the Advisory Committee on Bankruptcy Rules, Judicial Conference of the United
States, 1973 to present, in Chicago (March 12, 1985).
41. The debtor's filing of a bankruptcy petition automatically stays the commencement or
continuation of any proceeding against the debtor to recover a pre-petition claim, to enforce a
pre-petition judgment, to obtain possession of property, to create, perfect, or enforce a lien,
or to effect the set off of a pre-petition debt. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1982 & Supp. 1984).
42. id. § 362.
43. Id.
44. Section 362(b)(4) excepts from the stay enforcement of police or regulatory powers of
a governmental unit. Id. 362(b)(4).
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against the debtor without violating the automatic stay provision.4 5 Also,
government agencies generally will not be stayed from enforcing prior judg-
ments that order specific performance or some other equitable remedy.4
6
Nevertheless, a government action to obtain money damages from a debtor
to correct an environmental hazard is stayed by the Code. 47 Section 362(b)(5)
precludes any government action to enforce a compensatory money judgment
against a bankrupt debtor. A government agency may not seek the actual
payment of money from the debtor to finance th6 cleanup of an environ-
mental hazard. Under the principle that damages are generally awarded to
compensate a party for injury already suffered, the government is stayed
under the Code from seeking contribution from a bankrupt polluter to clean
up a hazardous waste dump.
Although the automatic stay provision can preclude state government
action against a bankrupt polluter, this section was not intended by Congress
to preempt enforcement of state environmental law. Sections 362(b)(4) and
(5), -when read together, logically imply that state governments generally
retain their authority to enforce laws against bankrupt debtors. 4 Despite this
logical inference, application of section 362(b)(5) hampers government efforts
to impose liability on polluters. A government agency that seeks to enforce
environmental laws against a debtor may be barred by the Code from seeking
money damages. If a government agency is unable to enforce a judgment
against the debtor because of the stay, the agency must stand in line with
all of the other creditors. Unless the state receives priority under some
provision of the Code, 49 the agency can at best expect a nominal payment
45. The legislative history of the Code reflects the following interpretation of the automatic
stay provision:
Section 362(b)(4) indicates that the stay under section 362(a)(1) does not apply to
affect the commencement or continuation of an action or proceeding by a govern-
mental. unit to enforce the governmental unit's police or regulatory power. This
section is intended to be given a narrow construction in order to permit governmental
units to pursue actions to protect the public health and safety and not to apply to
actions by a governmental unit to protect pecuniary interests in property of the
debtor or property of the estate.
124 CONG. REC. 32,395 (1978) (statement of Rep. Edwards). See also In re Conarico Quarries
Inc., 466 F. Supp. 1333 (D.P.R. 1979) (injunction against continued violation of environmental
laws an acceptable use of a state's police and regulatory powers); Aaron, Bankruptcy Stays of
Environmental Regulation: Harvest of Commercial Timber as an Introduction to a Clash of
Policies, 12 ENV'T. L. 1 (1981).
46. See, e.g., Penn Terra Ltd. v. Department of Envtl. Resources, 733 F.2d 267, 271 (3d
Cir. 1984).
47. See, e.g., id. at 278-79.
48. Sections 362(b)(4) and (5), when read together, imply that Congress preserved the states's
rights to enforce their laws, except those requiring the payment of money. See Penn Terra Ltd.
v. Department of Envtl. Resources, 733 F.2d 267, 273 (3d Cir. 1984).
49. See, e.g., In re T.P. Long Chemical Co., No. 581-906 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Jan. 1984)
(waste removal effort an obligation of the estate and entitled to administrative expense priority);
1076 [Vol. 34:1069
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on its claim. While the goals of the Code might be satisfied by this result,
state and federal governments are left with unfulfilled and costly cleanup
obligations.
In Penn Terra Ltd. v. Department of Environmental Resources, " the
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit determined that the
Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources (DER) could enforce
an injunction against a debtor to abate an environmental nuisance. Before
Penn Terra filed for bankruptcy, it entered into a consent decree with the
state in which the company agreed to correct its violations of Pennsylvania's
pollution laws. After Penn Terra filed a Chapter Seven bankruptcy petition,
t:he DER sued the company in state court to enforce compliance with the
consent decree. Penn Terra, in turn, filed a Petition for Contempt in the
bankruptcy court against the DER arguing that the DER's action violated
the automatic stay provision.
The court of appeals held that the DER's action to enforce the injunction
was exempt from the automatic stay provision." The court reasoned that
enforcement of the injunction was an exercise of regulatory power, which
fell under the section 362(b)(4) exception to the automatic stay.52 The court
also interpreted section 362(b)(5) of the Code 3 as expanding the exception
in section 362(b)(4) to cover both the entry and enforcement of an injunc-
tion . 4 The state court's injunction was allowed to be enforced because its
purpose was to protect the public health and safety by preventing future
harm to the environment."
The Code permits enforcement of an equitable injunction against a debtor
even if the debtor must expend funds from the estate to comply with the
decree. In United States v. Price,56 the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit held that a debtor could be ordered to conduct a diagnostic environ-
mental study of its property-an equitable order-at the debtor's own ex-
pense. 7 The court held that such an order is consistent with the Code so
long as the act ordered by the injunction is prospective and not compensa-
tory. 8
I re Laurinburg Oil Co., No. B-84-00011 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. Sept. 1984) (cleanup of waste
disposal facility preserves debtor's estate, is an obligation of the estate, and is entitled to
administrative expense priority).
50. 733 F.2d 267 (3d Cir. 1984).
51. Id. at 278-79. Penn Terra had been ordered to reclaim surface mines, to implement soil
erosion and sedimentation plans, to seal a deep mine, and to remove a strata stored over a gas
line. In re Penn Terra Ltd., 24 Bankr. 427, 430 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1982).
52. Penn Terra, 733 F.2d at 278-79.
53. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(5) (1982 & Supp. 1984).
54. Penn Terra, 733 F.2d at 272.
55. Id. at 273-73.
56. 688 F.2d 204 (3d Cir. 1982).
57. Id. at 212. "Injunctions, which by their terms compel expenditures of money, may
similarly be permissible forms of equitable relief."
58. Id; see also Penn Terra, 733 F.2d at 276-77.
19851 1077
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In part to resolve the conflict between bankruptcy law and environmental
protection, Congress passed the Comprehensive Environmental Response
Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) in 1980.9 CERCLA created a
civil cause of action for the mismanagement of hazardous waste, and estab-
lished the Superfund to finance the cleanup of oil, toxic substances, and
hazardous waste spills.60 CERCLA and the Superfund were intended to
provide funds to clean up hazardous waste sites that were either abandoned
by unknown parties or owned by insolvent parties. 6' Unfortunately, the
program has met with little success. To receive Superfund money, a state
must agree to pay ten percent of the costs of any remedial action, must
assure that disposal facilities are available, and must agree to administer
remedial measures. 62 Since these requirements have proved to be beyond the
fiscal means of most states, only a few states have received the funds. 63 As
a result, cleanup efforts have been delayed indefinitely. 64
Polluting companies should theoretically finance the cleanup of environ-
mental hazards themselves. The Code, however, has in practice shielded
bankrupt companies from accountability. To hold a debtor financially liable
for the correction of environmental law violations, the cleanup judgment
must be fully satisfied before the polluter has an opportunity to file for
bankruptcy and discharge the liability.65 If cleanup judgments were exempted
59. Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act, Pub. L. No.
96-510, 94 Stat. 2767-2811 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9601-9657 (1982)). Congress passed CERCLA
to correct the inadequacies of section 311 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 (1982),
and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. 6921 (1982). Section 311
established a federal fund to finance the cleanup of oil spills, with the fund having the right
to reimbursement from responsible parties. The Clean Water Act, however, covered only
contamination of surface waters. The RCRA was passed as a plan to govern the discharge of
pollutants into the country's land base. Because of the tragic consequences of improper,
negligent, and reckless hazardous waste disposal practices (the "inactive hazardous waste site
problem"), Congress developed the Superfund as a mechanism to clean up waste dumps. See
United States v. Price, 577 F. Supp. 1103, 1108-09 (D.N.J. 1983).
60. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 9606 (abatement actions); id. § 9607 (liability); id. § 9611 (uses
of fund).
61. H. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 22, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 6119, 6123.
62. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(3) (1982). See United States v. Reilly Tar & Chemical Corp., 546
F. Supp. 1100 (D. Minn. 1982) (federal government must enter into cooperative agreement with
affected state before President can authorize remedial actions).
63. See, e.g., Anderson, Hazardous Waste Superfunds: Legislation and Economics, 52
UMKC L. REV. 388, 390 & n. 25 (1984) (most states can only raise a fraction of the matching
funds).
64. Id. at 388.
65. Section 523(a) of the Bankruptcy Code lists ten debts that are not dischargeable under
section 727. Section 523(a)(6) excepts from discharge a debt that is for "willful and malicious
injury by the debtor to another entity or to the property of another entity." 11 U.S.C. §
523(a)(6) (1982 & Supp. 1984). The outcome of the Kovacs case might have been decided
differently had Ohio sought to exclude the cleanup obligation from discharge by alleging that
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from discharge as a rule, however, it would thwart one of the fundamental
goals of the Code; the debtors would remain liable for satisfaction of pre-
bankruptcy cleanup judgments and would not be afforded the "fresh start"
that they legitimately sought under the Code. In the face of vague legislative
standards, courts must make sensitive decisions as to whether environmental
or bankruptcy interests will prevail in a particular case.
III. THE SUPREME COURT'S TREATMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW CLAIMS UNDER THE CODE: OHIO V. KOVACS
The Kovacs case began in the late 1970's with the entry of a consent
decree between the state of Ohio and the Chem-Dyne Corporation [Chem-
Dyne]. Chem-Dyne hauled, stored, disposed, and recycled industrial and
hazardous waste at a facility in Hamilton, Ohio. The state of Ohio filed suit
in 1977 against William Lee Kovacs, the chief executive officer of Chem-
Dyne, as well as Chem-Dyne and other corporate entities owned by Kovacs.
The complaint alleged that the Chem-Dyne plant caused water pollution and
created a public nuisance, in violation of the environmental laws and regu-
lations of Ohio. On July 18, 1979, Kovacs and the state settled their disputes.
The settlement, decreed in a Stipulation and Judgment Entry, stated that
the defendants were not liable under any of Ohio's environmental laws. The
Judgment Entry nevertheless ordered Kovacs and the other defendants to
abate pollution at the Chem-Dyne site, to remove the waste stored on the
site, and to pay $75,000 to Ohio's Division of Wildlife as compensation for
fish that had died as a result of the pollution. 66
Kovacs ultimately failed to comply with the Judgment Entry. In response,
the state sought appointment of a receiver to take charge of the Chem-Dyne
site and to execute Kovacs's end of the settlement. 67 The court granted the
state's request and gave the receiver authority to carry out the obligations
imposed upon Kovacs by the Judgment Entry.68 Kovacs was thereby required
Kovacs's dumping of the waste was a willful and malicious act.
Section 523(a)(7) excepts from discharge any debt that is for a "fine, penalty or forfeiture
payable to and for the benefit of a governmental unit, and is not compensation for actual
pecuniary loss." Id. § 523(a)(7). If, for instance, the EPA had imposed a fine on Kovacs for
violating environmental laws, that fine would have been excepted from discharge by section
523(a)(7) so long as it was not a compensatory payment for past damages.
66. Kovacs, 105 S. Ct. at 707.
67. The hazard that was the subject of the Judgment Entry was not completely abated at
the time the case was brought before the Supreme Court. Although tanks and drums of waste
that were on the surface of the site had been removed pursuant to action under CERCLA, not
all the tasks required by the Judgment Entry had been fulfilled. One of Kovacs's "removal"
techniques was to pour liquids on the ground and to let them soak into the soil. Muchnicki,
The Bankruptcy Issue in Environmental Cleanup Cases, HAZARDOUS WASTE REP., Nov. 1984,
at 4-5.
68. The order directed the receiver to take "complete and exclusive control, possession and
custody of all assets and property" of the defendants, including Kovacs, and to use such assets
to order compliance with the Judgment Entry of July 18, 1979. In re Kovacs, 681 F.2d 454,
455 (6th Cir. 1982).
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to turn over all of his nonexempt assets and was dispossessed of the Chem-
Dyne site. Before the state was able to progress with the cleanup, however,
Kovacs filed a personal petition for reorganization under Chapter Eleven,
and later Chapter Seven, of the Bankruptcy Code.69 On September 2, 1980,
Kovacs was adjudicated as bankrupt. 70
In an effort to apply part of Kovacs's post-bankruptcy income to the
receiver's unfinished tasks, the state filed a motion to discover Kovacs's
income and assets. 7' On October 20, 1980, the state filed a complaint in
bankruptcy court asserting that Kovacs's obligation to remove all waste
stored at the Chem-Dyne site was not subject to discharge under the Code.7 2
The state argued that the obligations imposed on Kovacs in the Judgment
Entry were not "claims" or "debts" as defined by the Code, and that only
obligations which involve debts or claims can be discharged in bankruptcy. 73
The bankruptcy court, the United States District Court for the Southern
District of Ohio, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit concluded that the state was seeking a money judgment that could
be discharged in bankruptcy. 4
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the Sixth Circuit's holding.
Justice White, writing for a unanimous Court, found that section 101(4)(B)
applied to the state's purported claim against Kovacs. Most of Justice White's
opinion analyzed and defined the terms of that section.7 The Court found
that Ohio had a right to an equitable remedy against Kovacs under state
law. The Court also found that the state's claim was converted to a judgment
in the form of an injunction that ordered the cleanup.7 6 Consequently,
Kovacs's failure to comply with the cleanup order constituted a breach of
performance with respect to the injunction that gave rise to a "claim" by
the state under the Code. The cleanup order against Kovacs was entered to
remedy Kovacs's statutory violation. The state conceded that the decree
entered against Kovacs ordering him to compensate the state for the injured
wildlife was a claim for bankruptcy purposes. 7  The Court therefore con-
cluded that the cleanup order against Kovacs was compensatory and that
69. I1 U.S.C. § 301 (1982 & Supp. 1984).
70. In re Kovacs, 29 Bankr. 816 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982). The United States Bankruptcy
Court for the Southern District of Ohio adjudicated Kovacs bankrupt.
71. In re Kovacs, 681 F.2d 454, 455 (6th Cir 1982).
72. Kovacs requested and received a stay of discovery in the bankruptcy court pursuant to
11 U.S.C. § 362 (1982 & Supp. 1984). Both the district court and the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision staying the discovery proceedings. 681 F.2d at 454. The Supreme
Court vacated and remanded the decision for a further consideration of mootness. Ohio v.
Kovacs, 103 S. Ct. 810 (1983).
73. Ohio v. Kovacs, 717 F.2d 984, 987 (6th Cir. 1983).
74. Id.
75. Kovacs, 105 S. Ct. at 707.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 708-09.
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Kovacs's failure to comply with each order constituted a breach of perform-
ance within the scope of section 101(4)(B).78
To support this finding, the Court showed that Congress intended to give
the term "claim" a broad definition.7 9 The Court also analyzed the phrase
"right to payment." The Code defines a "claim" in section 101(4)(B) as an
equitable remedy for breach of performance that gives rise to a right to
payment under the Code.80 The Court found that the drafters of the Code
intended for an equitable judgment that gives rise to an alternative right to
payment to be held as a claim for bankruptcy purposes."'
Accordingly, the Court found that the cleanup order against Kovacs was
a money judgment that gave rise to an alternative right to payment. The
contingent right to payment constituted a claim against the debtor's estate.
The Court's opinion relied heavily on the fact that Kovacs had been dis-
possesed of the Chem-Dyne site by the state-appointed receiver. The Court
found that because Kovacs was not in possession of the property, he could
not clean up the site. Kovacs was consequently held liable only for damages.82
Moreover, the state's insistent pursuit of damages against Kovacs, as an
alternative to specific performance, converted the cleanup duty to a judgment
for damages. The Court concluded that this money judgment could be
discharged in bankruptcy.
Justice O'Connor concurred with the Court in a separate opinion. Justice
O'Connor addressed Ohio's argument that if damages under an injunction
to correct environmental hazards were dischargeable in bankruptcy, then
states would be unable to finance the enforcement of environmental laws. 83
Justice O'Connor responded that the Court's holding helped preserve the
right of states as creditors to seek and receive a fair portion of a debtor's
assets upon distribution. Had Ohio's cleanup order not been found to be a
"claim" under the Code, the state might have been precluded from recovering
any money owed by Kovacs under the cleanup order. 84 Justice O'Connor
78. Id. at 708-09. For a court to determine what actions constitute a "breach of perform-
ance" under section 101(4)(B), it must identify the unfulfilled obligation and determine the
basis upon which that obligation is owed. If the obligation is one which was imposed by a
contract or implied by law, then failure to fulfill the obligation is a breach of performance in
the context of section 101(4)(B).
79. Id. at 709.
80. 11 U.S.C. § 101(4)(B) (1982).
81. Kovacs, 105 S. Ct. at 709.
82. In re Kovacs, 717 F.2d 984, 987-88 (6th Cir. 1983).
83. Kovacs, 105 S. Ct. at 712 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
84. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor stated that a corporate Chapter Seven
debtor charged with an obligation similar to Kovacs's would be unable to make any post-
bankruptcy payments in compliance with the obligation. In a corporate Chapter Seven liqui-
dation, all that remains after distribution of the corporation's assets is a corporate shell-a
fictitious entity with no assets, capital, or future. Thus, if a state is precluded from asserting
a claim of noncompliance against a corporate debtor's estate, the state will be unable to receive
even a pro rata distribution of the debtor's assets. As a result, the state will be left with the
obligation to clean up the site without any assistance from the corporate debtor or its estate.
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also concluded that the Court's holding did not prevent states from enforcing
cleanup orders. To the contrary, it assures states the opportunity to partic-
ipate in the distribution of a debtor's assets.
Justice O'Connor offered an additional reason why the Court's holding
was not hostile to state enforcement of environmental laws. Under the Code,
Congress left the property rights of creditors in the assets of a debtor's
estate to be determined under state law .8  The classification of a state's
interest as either a lien on property, a perfected security interest, or an
unsecured claim is also determined by state law. 86 The state's claim to the
assets of the debtor's estate, relative to other creditors, can therefore be
advanced by a state statutory right of priority for cleanup funds. 7 According
to Justice O'Connor, states can obtain full compliance with cleanup orders
under state law by giving the cleanup judgments the status of statutory liens
or secured claims.8 8
IV. ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM OF THE KO VACS DECISION
The Kovacs Court analyzed the breadth of the term "claim" under the
Code. 9 Ohio sought to prove that Chem-Dyne's obligation to clean a waste
dump was not a "claim" within the meaning of the Code, and therefore
could not be discharged in bankruptcy." Because a debt is a liability on a
claim for bankruptcy purposes, the court focused on the definition and scope
of a "claim." 9' The Court, however, did not explain why it focused on
section 101(4)(B), rather than section 101(4)(A). Section 101(4)(A) defines a
"claim" as virtually any right to payment. 92 The Court implied that Kovacs's
obligation to clean up the Chem-Dyne site was a judgment for damages; 93
as such, it might logically have been treated under section 101(4)(A). Despite
this possibility, the Court did not classify Ohio's right to payment as a claim
under section 101(4)(A). Instead, the Court viewed the state's underlying
right to equitable relief as controlling the definition of the state's interest. 94
The Court applied section 101(4)(B) to the case because Kovacs's obligation
85. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring). See also Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 54 (1979)
(observing Congressional preference to allow state law to govern).
86. Kovacs, 105 S. Ct. at 712 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
87. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring). See also II U.S.C. 545 (1982 & Supp. 1984) (trustee
may avoid statutory liens only in specified circumstances).
88. Kovacs, 105 S. Ct. at 712 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
89. Id. at 708 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
90. Id. at 707-08 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
91. Id. at 705 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
92. I1 U.S.C. § 101(4)(A)(1982 & Supp. 1984).
93. The Court did not disturb the court of appeal's judgment that Kovacs's cleanup duty
had been reduced to a monetary obligation. Kovacs, 105 S. Ct. at 710.
94. See id. at 710. "The State had the right to an equitable remedy under Ohio law, and
that right has been reduced to a judgment in the form of an injunction ordering the cleanup."
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to clean up the Chem-Dyne site was developed in the consent decree as an
equitable remedy.
As defined by section 101(4)(B), a "claim" must begin as a right to an
"equitable remedy" that results in a "breach of performance" and ends in
a "right to payment." 95 The Kovacs Court found that Ohio had a right to
an equitable remedy from Kovacs under state law that satisfied the first
element under section 101(4)(B).96 The second element, a "breach of per-
formance," was defined by the court to include any violation of a judicial
order. Since Kovacs was obliged to clean up the Chem-Dyne site under a
judicial order, his failure to comply with the cleanup order was a breach of
performance under section 101(4)(B).
The third element of a claim under 101(4)(B), a "right to payment," was
considered by the Court to include a fine that is ordered by a court to
substitute for specific performance under a judicial order. The state unsuc-
cessfully argued that Kovacs's breach of his obligation, because it was a
violation of a state statute, did not constitute a "right to payment" within
the meaning of section 101(4)(B). 97 The Kovacs Court rejected Ohio's ar-
gument and held that the obligation owed by Kovacs was a right to payment
that was contingent upon Kovacs's failure to perform. 98
The Supreme Court determined that Congress intended for contingent
remedies-those in which the liable party could satisify its obligation with
either a payment or specific performance-to be counted as "breaches of
payment" under section 101(4)(B). 99 Based on its examination of the legis-
lative history, the Court concluded that Kovacs's breach of performance
created the state's contingent right to payment. Because Kovacs's dispos-
session of the Chem-Dyne site prohibited him from specifically performing
the cleanup, he was ordered to pay the costs of the cleanup. The Kovacs
Court reasoned that the cleanup obligation was "converted" into an obli-
gation to pay money.1°°
95. 11 U.S.C. § 101 (4)(B) (1982 & Supp. 1984).
96. Kovacs, 105 S. Ct. at 708.
97. Congress intended to define "claim" broadly. See H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 309, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5963, 6272; S. REP. No. 989, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 21, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5787, 5708. Accordingly,
the Court stated that a breach of performance is not limited to breaches of ordinary commercial
contracts. Kovacs, 105 S. Ct. at 708-09.
98. Kovacs, 105 S. Ct. at 708-09. Ohio contended that the cleanup order was entered to
remedy a statutory violation, and was therefore not a claim for bankruptcy purposes. The
Court rejected the state's argument because it was inconsistent with Ohio's admission that
Kovacs's obligation to pay a $75,000 fine to the state was a debt dischargeable in bankruptcy.
Since both the cleanup order and the fine were entered to remedy a statutory violation, neither
one could survive the bankruptcy discharge. Id.
99. See supra note 36.
100. Kovacs, 105 S. Ct. at 711. Ohio steadfastly pursued the payment of money to defray"
cleanup costs. At oral argument before the Court, state counsel conceded that after the receiver
was appointed, the only performance sought from Kovacs was the payment of the money.
Transcript of the Oral Argument at 19-20; Kovacs, 105 S. Ct. at 710-11.
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The Kovacs decision validated a joint statement of Representative Don
Edwards and Senator Dennis DeConcini that a judgment for specific per-
formance that includes an alternative right to payment when performance is
refused is a claim that can be discharged in bankruptcy.10 Ohio's claim was
discharged in Kovacs's bankruptcy proceeding because the Supreme Court
found that Kovacs's obligation to pay Ohio the costs of cleaning up the
Chem-Dyne site was a claim under section 101(4)(B).102 Once the Kovacs
Court decided that the Judgment Entry against Kovacs created a right to
payment for the state, the discharge of Kovacs's claim was inevitable. Kovacs
had been dispossessed of the authority to clean up the Chem-Dyne site and
Ohio sought to enforce his cleanup obligation by a money judgment.10 3 Since
the money judgment was found to be a claim within the meaning of the
Code, Kovacs obligation to pay the costs of cleaning the Chem-Dyne site
was properly discharged.
Justice O'Connor's concurrence addressed Ohio's concern that enforce-
ment of the Code in some settings would shield bankrupt companies from
the cost of cleaning environmental hazards.1°4 The concurring opinion is a
theoretical justification for the Court's holding. The Supreme Court was
called upon to decide whether the Code relieved debtors of the duty to abate
continuing threats to public health and safety. The Kovacs opinion deter-
mined that a state that cannot obtain sufficient reimbursement for cleanup
costs from the debtor must bear the costs of cleanup itself. The majority of
the Supreme Court in Kovacs was unwilling to confront directly the conflict
between federal bankruptcy law and state environmental law enforcement
efforts. Justice O'Connor, to her credit, explained how state environmental
protection efforts could be continued in spite of the Code.
101. See supra note 36.
102. 1i U.S.C. § 727(b) (1982 & Supp. 1984). The Court emphasized that its decision did
not shield Kovacs from prosecution for his violations of state environmental laws. The decision
also did not shield Kovacs from criminal contempt proceedings for not performing his obligations
under the Judgment Entry. In addition, the monetary penalties imposed on Kovacs before he
filed for bankruptcy were not dischargeable. Kovacs, 105 S. Ct. at 711.
103. Kovacs, 105 S. Ct. at 710-11.
104. Justice O'Connor suggested two reasons why the Kovacs holding was not hostile to
state environmental protection efforts. First, states were free to give cleanup judgments the
status of statutory liens or secured claims, thereby protecting the state's interest in the enforce-
ment of environmental laws. Id. at 712.
Second, the Court's holding preserved the states's authority to seek compensation from liable
bankrupt corporations. A corporate debtor ordinarily transfers its property to a trustee for
distribution among creditors. The corporation then usually dissolves under state law, leaving
no post-bankruptcy earnings for the state to use to fulfill a cleanup order. The Kovacs decision
nevertheless allows states to secure needed funds from liable debtors since the state retains a
claim to pre-bankruptcy assets against the trustee. Id. On this latter point, the Court agreed to
review two decisions concerning the cleanup duties of a trustee for a bankrupt company. See
In re Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F.2d 912 (3d Cir. 1984); In re Quanta Resources Corp.,
739 F.2d 927 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. granted and cases consolidated sub nom. O'Neill v. City of
New York, 105 S. Ct. 1168 (1985).
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By ignoring the legal conflict presented by the case, the majority under-
stated the impact that its decision will have on state environmental protection
efforts. The Kovacs decision will undermine state efforts to finance costly
environmental cleanups. Thus, the Supreme Court left unresolved the conflict
between federal bankruptcy policy and state environmental law enforcement.
V. IMPACT OF THE KOVACS DEcIsIoN
The Kovacs decision will significantly affect future state enforcement of
environmental laws. When the Supreme Court discharged Kovacs from his
obligation to pay for the cleanup costs associated with the Chem-Dyne site,
the Court opened the door for other insolvent debtors to similarly seek a
discharge of their cleanup obligations. The Kovacs decision will encourage
other courts faced with the same conflict to ignore environmental concerns
and to apply the Code strictly against state environmental protection agencies.
Kovacs thereby erodes state enforcement efforts that arguably conflict with
the Code.
Although Kovacs may impede some state environmental cleanup efforts,
the decision does not exempt debtors from all environmental liability. For
instance, in future litigation the Kovacs decision can be limited to its specific
facts. That is, the controversy must involve an insolvent debtor who was
dispossessed of the contaminated property, and the state must have "con-
verted" the cleanup obligation into an obligation to pay money. A state that
seeks to impose liability on bankrupt property owners for the cleanup of
environmental hazards should seek specific performance of the cleanup
obligations, and should neither dispossess the debtor of the property nor
convert the cleanup obligation into an obligation to pay money. Such state
efforts create legal duties that are not claims under the Code and may not
be discharged in bankruptcy.
While Kovacs can be limited to its facts, the decision remains a loose
cannon on the bankruptcy deck. After Kovacs, bankruptcy courts can dis-
charge a debtor's obligation to pay the costs of cleaning a hazardous waste
site even if the debtor created the hazard. Justice O'Connor suggested
alternatives to Ohio's enforcement strategy that may circumvent the problems
created by Kovacs.105 Nonetheless, a state that fails to recover the cleanup
costs associated with the cleanup order entered against a debtor prior to the
debtor's discharge'06 will be unable to recover the costs from the debtor's
105. See supra notes 83-88, 104 and accompanying text.
106. There are various ways by which a state can recover some of the costs associated with
cleaning up a hazardous waste site. See, e.g., Ohio v. Kovacs, 105 S. Ct. 705, 712 (1985)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (judgment orders may be given the status of statutory liens or
secured claims); In re Quanta Resources Corp., 739 F.2d 912 (3d Cir. 1984) (Code does not
permit debtors to abandon property in contravention of state and local environmental protection
laws), cert. granted sub nom. O'Neill v. City of New York, 105 S. Ct. 1168 (1985); In re T.P.
Long Chemical Co., No. 581-906 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Jan. 1984) (state can seek reimbursement
of cleanup costs as an administrative expense from debtor's estate).
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post-bankruptcy income or assets.'0 7 In such a situation, the state has no
recourse against the bankrupt debtor and must either write off the cleanup
costs or seek reimbursement from another responsible party.'0
The experience with the Superfund shows that states are either unable or
unwilling to finance cleanup efforts by themselves.' °9 Although the federal
Superfund pays for ninety percent of the remedial measures required to clean
up and manage waste sites,"0 states are responsible for the remaining ten
percent."' When the costs of cleanups run into the billions of dollars, the
state's ten percent share becomes quite substantial.
The federal Superfund itself may also be affected by the Kovacs decision." 2
The Superfund is subsidized by excise taxes on crude oil, imported petroleum
107. Section 727(b) discharges the debtor of all debts, except those listed in section 523, that
arose before the date of the order for relief. In a voluntary Chapter Seven or Chapter Eleven
proceeding, the date of the petition is the date of the order for relief. I I U.S.C. 727(b) (1982
& Supp. 1984).
108. The EPA reports that between November, 1980 and December 1983, $7.2 million was
returned to the federal Superfund through cost recovery suits prosecuted by state or federal
government entities against responsible parties. The federal Superfund has also recovered $332
million in out-of-court settlements from parties responsible for abandoned hazardous waste
sites. The remainder of the $918 million obligated by the EPA for Superfund program work
will probably not be recovered. 15 ENv'T REP. (BNA) 1531 (Jan. 25, 1985).
109. 15 ENv'T REP. (BNA) 2137-38 (Apr. 5, 1985) (states have not paid statutory share of
cleanup costs).
110. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(3) (1984).
Ill. States have adopted different strategies for raising the necessary revenue. See, e.g., ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 111-1/2, § 1022.2 (1983) (requiring payment of fees by hazardous waste facility
operators based on amount of hazardous waste received); MICH. CoMp. LAWS § 299.542 (1979)
(requiring hazardous waste disposal facility operators to pay an annual surcharge fee into a
Disposal Facility Trust); Mo. REV. STAT. § 260.391 (Supp. 1984) (waste producers must pay
hazardous waste permit, license, and generator fees to Hazardous Waste Commission); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.11(i) (West Supp. 1982) (imposing taxes to generate revenue for the
New Jersey Spill Compensation Fund); N.Y. ENVTL. CONSERV. LAW § 27-0923(l) (McKinney
Supp. 1982) (taxing hazardous waste generators based upon the disposal method used).
112. Although the Superfund receives money from taxes on petroleum, chemical, and other
products, the fund relies most heavily on reimbursement from responsible parties. The EPA is
charged with dispensing the Superfund money and is also responsible for seeking reimbursement.
The EPA is often forced to seek reimbursement through legal proceedings, and sometimes those
proceedings are in bankruptcy court. The EPA is presently involved in 17 reimbursement cases
in bankruptcy court. Interview with Roger Grimes, Assistant Chief Counsel of the Environmental
Protection Agency, in Chicago, Illinois (Feb. 21, 1985).
Eighty-seven percent of the current Superfund's $1.6 billion is derived from a tax on 42
chemical ingredients and on crude oil, The remaining 13% comes from general revenues.
President Reagan's proposal would eliminate general revenues as a source of income for the
fund, and would levy a new tax on hazardous waste storage, treatment, and disposal facilities.
Senator Robert Stafford, Chairman of the Senate Environment and Public Works Committee,
has expressed a willingness to accept President Reagan's funding proposal, but he appears
unwilling to compromise on the amount of funds necessary for cleanup. Representative James
J. Florio, sponsor of the $10.1 billion Superfund bill that passed the House in the 98th Congress,
stated that the Administration's funding proposal was inadequate. Representative Florio noted
that the House last year rejected a tax on waste because it was "unpredictable and uncertain."
15 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1787-88 (Mar. 1, 1985).
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products, and certain basic industrial chemicals."' The Superfund is used to
finance immediate measures to remove hazardous substances from the en-
vironment." 4 Under current law, the Superfund's expenses can eventually be
charged to the responsible parties, who are strictly liable without proof of
negligence." 5 If parties that are liable to the Superfund can file for bank-
ruptcy before the EPA is able to recover expenses from them, the Superfund
will have to absorb the entire expense of the cleanup. 1 6 The Superfund was
not created by Congress to be a fund to finance all necessary cleanup
operations around the country. Rather, it was intended that the Superfund
serve as a limited, temporary source of funds for emergency cleanups and
as a back-up for the few cases in which the responsible parties were either
insolvent or unidentified. Neither the states nor the Superfund can continue
to bear the costs of hazardous waste site cleanups. Thousands of sites,
however, are in need of such cleanup." 7 The Kovacs decision does not
provide for this threat to the nation's environment.
V. CONCLUSION
The Kovacs decision elevated debtors' interests over the public and gov-
ernment interest in arresting environmental damage. The decision allows a
debtor to escape liability for the mishandling of hazardous waste by filing
for bankruptcy. The filing of a petition for bankruptcy freezes all of the
debtor's assets and stays proceedings against the debtor. The Kovacs decision
113. There is also a 12.5% contribution from other general funds. R. ZENER, GUIDE TO
FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 365 (1981).
114. 46 U.S.C. § 9607 (1982). Of the $1.554 billion appropriated from the fund by Congress
in the last four years to carry out the Superfund law, $918 million has been used by the EPA
to fund emergency and long-term site cleanups. According to the EPA, $332 million has been
recovered as a result of out-of-court settlements among state and federal government entities
and parties responsible for the sites. 15 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1531 (Jan. 25, 1985).
115. According to Lee M. Thomas, Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency,
the EPA "will go after every dollar" it spends cleaning up Superfund hazardous waste sites.
Thomas predicted that in fiscal year 1985 the EPA would reach cleanup settlement agreements
totaling three times the amount reached in fiscal 1984 ($145 million). 15 ENV'T REp. (BNA)
1765(Feb. 22, 1985).
116. See United States v. A & F Materials Co., 578 F. Supp. 1249, 1258 (S.D. 11. 1984)
(Superfund must absorb costs associated with the liability of unknown and insolvent parties),
117. The official list of sites eligible for CERCLA cleanups now contains 538 sites; 244
additional sites were proposed for listing in October 1984. The assets of the Superfund ($1.6
billion for five years) will not finance the cleanup of the numerous hazardous waste sites
throughout the country. As of October 31, 1984, long term cleanups were being conducted at
134 sites on the National Priorities list of sites eligible for Superfund cleanups. About 65 of
those cleanups are being carried out by the EPA and the states, while 70 others are being
conducted by responsible parties under enforcement orders. The EPA has estimated that there
are close to 22,000 potentially hazardous sites which should be included in the long term
remedial cleanup program. Of the 22,000 sites, the EPA has made "preliminary assessments"
of 11,662 sites, and has investigated 4,365 sites for possible inclusion on the National Priorities
List. 15 ENV'T REP. (BNA) 1531 (Jan. 25, 1985).
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has the effect of shifting the cost of environmental cleanups from the violaters
to the public. This result is unfair and untenable in light of the central goals
of tort law: to hold negligent parties liable for injuries caused by their
carelessness, and to compensate the injured parties.
The Kovacs Court arrived at its conclusion because the Code is designed
to prevent any party who looks like a creditor, even a state government,
from collecting against a debtor adversely to other creditors. Justice O'Con-
nor modified this rigid approach to the Code by suggesting that states can
amend their statutes to make themselves secured creditors in environmental
cases. This method would narrow the conflict between bankruptcy and
environmental law, and would ensure steady financing for pollution cleanup
efforts through secured damage awards.
Jeff J. Marwil
